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I. INTRODUCTION
In the last year, the United States has joined global efforts to combat
climate change by joining an international treaty, the 2015 Paris Agreement
(Paris Agreement or Agreement), and instituting the Clean Power Plan
(CPP), a domestic regulation introduced to comply with the international
treaty. The purpose of this Note is to ascertain the international implications
stemming from the possibility of the U.S. Supreme Court potentially striking
down the CPP. More specifically, it will determine how this action could
impact other signatories to the Paris Agreement and their contributions
towards combatting global climate change. And while the United States has
recently renounced its involvement in the Agreement, the CPP’s fate will
still play a major role in the United States’ carbon emission policies and lead
other signatories to take note and react accordingly while developing their
own climate policies. This Note will not speculate whether the issues
presented may be remedied by future global climate deals.
II. A SYNOPSIS OF THE 2015 PARIS AGREEMENT
In order to understand the role that the United States will play in the
implementation of the 2015 Paris Agreement, it is imperative that one
understands what the Agreement is and what it purports to do. Between
November and December of 2015, the Twenty-first Session of the
Conference of the Parties (COP 21) was held in Paris with the aim of
formulating an effective global climate change initiative.1 By the end of the
COP 21, the parties reached what has been called an “ambitious effort[ ] to
combat climate change”: the 2015 Paris Agreement.2 Of the 197 parties
attending COP 21, the Paris Agreement currently has 195 signatories, 175 of
which joined on April 22, 2016, during its signature ceremony.3 However,
the significance of the Paris Agreement lies not simply in the quantity of
signatories it has accumulated, but rather the fact that these signatories
consented to the Agreement’s exceptionally ambitious goals and stringent
methods outlined to meet those goals.

1

Paris Climate Change Conference – November 2015, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE [UNFCCC], http://unfccc.int/meetings/paris_nov_2015/me
eting/8926.php (last visited Oct. 23, 2017).
2
The Paris Agreement, UNFCCC, http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9485.php (last
visited Oct. 23, 2017).
3
Paris Agreement – Status of Ratification, UNFCCC, http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/ite
ms/9444.php (last visited Oct. 23, 2017).
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The combination of several key features make this international
agreement unique. Most notable of the Agreement’s features are mitigation
and adaptation efforts, the collective intent of developed countries to support
developing countries in their endeavors to fight global climate change, and
the accountability and transparency measures imposed on party members to
ensure compliance.4 In regard to mitigation, the Paris Agreement establishes
a formidable goal of keeping the global average temperature within 2 degrees
Celsius above pre-industrial levels with the hopes that the Parties’ efforts
might even be able to stay below the 1.5 degrees mark.5 In order to meet this
objective, the Agreement demands that each Party “shall prepare,
communicate and maintain successive nationally determined contributions
(NDCs) that it intends to achieve.”6 Each Party’s NDC should exemplify a
strong effort to mitigate their contribution to greenhouse gases and, over
time, prove to the rest of the Agreement’s Parties that they are meeting their
commitments.7 Further, due to the nature of NDCs, the Paris Agreement
grants each member the right to tailor their own goals and the procedures
they prefer to employ based on its “respective capabilities, in light of
different national circumstances.”8 It should come as no surprise that
retaining this amount of flexibility is comforting to many states when
binding themselves to international agreements.9
As a supplement to the Parties’ mitigatory plans, the Paris Agreement
also calls for Parties to engage in adaptation efforts.10 The global aim for
adaptation is to “enhanc[e] adaptive capacity, strengthen[ ] resilience and
reduc[e] vulnerability to climate change.”11 To achieve this, the Agreement
encourages Parties to share information, strengthen any institutional
arrangements they may have, further scientific research, and assist
developing countries.12 In addition, parties are mandated to “engage in
4
Paris Agreement, EUR. COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/international/negotiat
eonns/paris/index_en.htm (last updated Sept. 23, 2017).
5
Paris Agreement, art. 2, Dec. 12, 2015, UNFCCC, https://unfccc.int/files/essential_back
ground/convention/application/pdf/english_paris_agreement.pdf.
6
Id. art. 4.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
See Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CALIF. L.
REV. 1823, 1870–71 (2002) (noting that “[b]y adjusting their level of commitment, states are
able to signal their willingness to honor their promises and can control the amount of
reputational capital they stake as collateral. This flexibility allows states that enjoy a high
level of mutual trust to enter into agreements that come with only low levels of
commitment.”).
10
Paris Agreement, supra note 5, art. 7.
11
Id.
12
Id.
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adaptation planning processes and the implementation of actions.”13 This
shows that the Agreement provides flexibility, albeit limited, for its members
in effectuating these policies.
While these zealous efforts are inspiring for most climate-concerned
individuals, none will get off the ground without reliable and sufficient
sources of funding. Fortunately, the Paris Agreement takes this concern into
account and establishes three areas where developed countries will provide
support: financial assistance, technology development and transfer, and
capacity-building efforts.14
The most crucial area of support, financial assistance, already has a goal
in place for the near future. By 2020, developed countries are seeking to
provide $100 billion USD annually to developing countries to assist their
climate change efforts.15 This contribution is to remain fixed until 2025 after
which it is expected that developed countries will agree upon a new and even
greater contribution.16 While it is evident that developed countries will lead
the way in raising these funds, the Paris Agreement also urges developing
countries to contribute financially if they are able.17 It is the Agreement’s
objective that these “scaled-up financial resources . . . achieve a balance
between adaptation and mitigation, [while] taking into account countrydriven strategies, and the priorities and needs of developing country
Parties.”18 It even places a special emphasis on assisting particularly
vulnerable parties, such as the least developed countries and developing
small islands.19
In addition to financial assistance, developed countries are also expected
to assist developing countries with technology development and transfer.20
The Paris Agreement expressly states that the Parties recognize how critical
the innovation and sharing of technology is towards meeting its long-term
aims “to improve resilience to climate change and to reduce greenhouse gas

13

Id.
Paris Agreement, supra note 5, arts. 9–11.
15
Paris Agreement, supra note 4. See also Camila Domonoske, 2 Degrees, $100 Billion:
The World Climate Agreement, By the Numbers, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Dec. 12, 2015, 5:33 PM),
http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/12/12/459502597/2-degrees-100-billion-the-wo
rld-climate-agreement-by-the-numbers (reporting on the current financial obligations of
developed countries).
16
Paris Agreement, supra note 4.
17
Paris Agreement, supra note 5, art. 9.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id. art. 10.
14
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emissions.”21 Ideally, this collaborative approach would substantially reduce
the use of dated technology that emits large amounts of greenhouse gases.
The last support area the Paris Agreement prescribes is capacitybuilding.22 This area is meant to improve developing countries’ capacity and
ability to implement effective climate action measures.23 More specifically,
the Agreement defines these measures as “including, inter alia, to implement
adaptation and mitigation actions, and should facilitate technology
development, dissemination and deployment, access to climate finance,
relevant aspects of education, training and public awareness, and the
transparent, timely and accurate communication of information.”24 Over
time, these actions should render developing countries less dependent on
other countries in combatting climate change, a benefit to all parties
involved.
The last major components of the Paris Agreement are the accountability
and transparency measures meant to promote compliance among the Parties.
First and foremost, it is the “first-ever universal legally binding global
climate deal.”25 However, this proclamation does not tell the entire story.
To explain, it helps to know that the legal nature of the Paris Agreement was
written to appease both the European Union and small island nations—who
insisted upon giving NDCs the legal effect of requiring a Party to achieve its
goals—and Parties such as the United States, who opposed affording NDCs
such strict legal authority.26 The Agreement’s language was the ultimate
compromise between the two. In Article 4.2, the Agreement states, “Parties
shall pursue domestic mitigation measures, with the aim of achieving the
objectives of such contributions.”27 As written, Parties are required to
undertake methods to pursue their own NDCs, but there is no outstanding
legal obligation for Parties to successfully meet their NDC goals.
Essentially, this is “an obligation of conduct rather than an obligation of
result.”28

21
Id. See also Stephen Minas, Keeping the Paris Agreement’s Climate Technology
Promise, ECO-BUS. (Apr. 22, 2016), http://www.eco-business.com/opinion/keeping-the-parisagreements-climate-technology-promise/ (acknowledging the Paris Agreement’s focus on
technological innovation as an important measure for fighting climate change).
22
Paris Agreement, supra note 5, art. 11.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Paris Agreement, supra note 4; id. art. 13.
26
Daniel Bodansky, The Paris Climate Change Agreement: A New Hope?, 110 AM. J.
INT’L L. 288, 297 (2016) (discussing the arguments over granting NDCs legal effect).
27
Paris Agreement, supra note 5, art. 4.2.
28
Bodansky, supra note 26, at 304.
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In addition to the quasi-legal status of certain provisions, the Agreement
has another powerful tool in its arsenal to assure the parties comply:
transparency. The Agreement outlines a transparency framework meant “to
build mutual trust and confidence and promote effective implementation.”29
The framework will track each Party’s progress towards reaching its NDC,
provide an assessment of the financial support provided by Parties, and
submit the information to a technical expert review.30 Finally, a “global
stocktake” will occur periodically which will “take stock of the
implementation of this Agreement to assess the collective progress towards
achieving the purpose of this Agreement and its long-term goals.”31
Throughout this process, Party members will be made aware of other
members’ inadequacies. The idea is that a stern transparency system will
incentivize parties to reach their commitments when they would otherwise
face scrutiny from their peers and the public.32 In sum, it is the weak legallybinding effect of the Agreement that pushes a Party to arrange its climate
goals and submit their progress, but it is the pressure from other Parties and
the public that assures that a Party will make honest attempts to follow
through with these goals.
III. THE UNITED STATES: A TEAM PLAYER?
In order for the Paris Agreement to make any substantive progress, it is
critical that the world’s largest economies partake. Moreover, skating by on
half-hearted efforts at truly reducing greenhouse gas emissions will not
suffice either. States with the most to contribute, like the United States, must
make honest attempts to do their part.
At the Paris Agreement’s signature ceremony on April 22, 2016, the
United States was among the 174 signatories to express their dedication to
the global climate deal.33 However, despite this outstanding initial support,
more is required of the signatories to effectuate the Agreement. Namely, the
Agreement requires that “at least 55 parties to the Convention accounting in
total for at least an estimated 55 % of the total global greenhouse gas
emissions [to] have deposited their instruments of ratification, acceptance,
approval or accession.”34 On September 3, 2016, the United States, in
29

Paris Agreement, supra note 5, art. 13.1.
Id. arts. 13.5, 13.6, 13.11.
31
Id. art. 14.1.
32
Bodansky, supra note 26, at 291.
33
Pamela Falk, U.S. Joins 174 Nations to Sign Hard-Won Climate Pact, CBS NEWS (Apr. 22,
2016), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-climate-pact-un-signing-ceremony-paris-agreement-co
p21/.
34
Paris Agreement, supra note 5, art. 21.1.
30
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conjunction with China, formally joined the Agreement.35 As recent data
shows that these two countries collectively contribute to over 40% of the
world’s CO2 emissions,36 the Paris Agreement likely would not have gone
into effect without their formal commitment. Clearly, the United States’
future efforts to comply with this Agreement are very pronounced and cannot
be undervalued.
Acknowledging its responsibility in this global effort, the United States
took several steps at the COP 21 to demonstrate its resolve to play an active
part.37 Specifically, the United States stated it would be a part of Mission
Innovation—a collection of twenty countries committing to doubling their
funding towards global clean energy research and development—as well as
double its grant-based, public financing for climate adaptation by 2020.38
Furthermore, the United States is encouraging contributions from subnational
governments, the private sector, and its citizens. For example, the Compact
of Mayors is a pledge comprised of 117 United States mayors that will
uniformly measure and report their respective cities’ impact and action
against climate change.39 The United States has also had 154 companies sign
onto the White House’s American Business Act on Climate Pledge.40 These
companies have pledged their support to the Paris Agreement and have
promised “to reduce their emissions, increase low-carbon investments,
deploy more clean energy and take other actions to build more sustainable
businesses and tackle climate change.”41 To increase citizen awareness and
knowledge about global climate change, the White House has introduced
another pledge, the American Campuses Act on Climate, under which higher
education communities promise to “transition to low-carbon energy while

35

Tanya Somanader, President Obama: The United States Formally Enters the Paris
Agreement, WHITE HOUSE (Sept. 3, 2016, 10:41 AM), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/
blog/2016/09/03/president-obama-united-states-formally-enters-paris-agreement.
36
See Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions Data, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY [EPA],
https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/global-greenhouse-gas-emissions-data#Country (last updated
Apr. 13, 2017), for a graphic indicating the global CO2 emissions by country. See also Each
Country’s Share of CO2 Emissions, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, http://www.ucsusa.org/g
lobal_warming/science_and_impacts/science/each-countrys-share-of-co2.html#.WduskGiPLIV
(last updated Nov. 18, 2014) (showing the top CO2 emitting countries’ rank and proportion of
global emissions).
37
U.S. Leadership and the Historic Paris Agreement to Combat Climate Change, WHITE
HOUSE (Dec. 12, 2015), https://www.obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/12/1
2/us-leadership-and-historic-paris-agreement-combat-climate-change.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id.
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enhancing sustainable and resilient practices.”42 Over 300 colleges and
universities representing more than 4 million students have joined this pledge
thus far.43
However, despite these initiatives to encourage everyone to do their part
to combat climate change, there is still a lack of force ensuring that actual,
substantive reductions of greenhouse emissions will occur. To remedy this
deficiency, the United States has relied on its regulatory agencies; the most
notable of which is the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The
United States has already taken some steps to help meet its future greenhouse
emission reduction commitments. For example, it has implemented stringent
fuel economy standards for passenger and commercial vehicles.44 Not to be
exempted from its own policies, in 2009, the Obama Administration directed
the federal government to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by 28% by
2020 as well as significantly improve their reliance on renewable sources of
energy.45 Lastly, the United States has also introduced standards to promote
energy efficiency, “including developing energy conservation standards for
appliances and equipment . . . mak[ing] energy efficiency accessible to rural
America, completing home efficiency upgrades,” and others.46
IV. INTRODUCING THE CLEAN POWER PLAN
Among these regulatory measures is the Clean Power Plan (CPP). It is an
EPA directive to establish “emission guidelines for states to follow in
developing plans to [reduce] GHG emissions from existing fossil fuel-fired
electric generating units.47 In other words, the CPP requires states to place
limitations on their power plants to reduce their carbon output by an EPAspecified amount.

42

American Campuses Act on Climate, WHITE HOUSE (Dec. 11, 2015), https://www.obama
whitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/12/11/american-campuses-act-climate.
43
Id.
44
Climate Change, WHITE HOUSE, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/energy/climatechange (last visited Sept. 25, 2017). See also Carbon Pollution from Transportation, EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/air-pollution-transportation/carbon-pollution-transportation (last updated
July 17, 2017) (outlining the new regulatory aims to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and
improve the fuel efficiency of motor vehicles).
45
Climate Change, supra note 44.
46
Id.
47
Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662, 64,703 (Dec. 22, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. Pt.
60) [hereinafter Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines]. What EPA Is Doing about Climate
Change, EPA, https://archive.epa.gov/epa/climatechange/what-epa-doing-about-climate-chang
e.html (last updated May 9, 2017).

GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

4/18/2018 2:05 PM

IS THE PARIS AGREEMENT ALREADY POISED FOR FAILURE?

565

To effectuate this regulation, the EPA drafted the CPP in a manner that
consists of three primary components which are to be implemented over the
course of an eight-year period beginning in 2022.48 First, it designates
emission performance rates for electric steam generating units and natural
gas combined cycle generating units that must be followed.49 These rates
will be based off the EPA’s “best system of emission reduction” standard.50
Second, are state-specific reduction goals, expressed as both emission rates
and total mass, which are to be “based on the above performance rates and
that state’s mix of [electric generating units].”51 Lastly, the CPP will supply
compliance guidelines to assist states with the development and
implementation of their respective plans.52
So how does the CPP play into the United States’ global commitments
regarding carbon emissions? It is expected that the CPP will reduce CO2
levels from the utility power sector by 32% of the sector’s 2005 level.53
Considering that these power plants accounted for approximately one-third
of the United States’ greenhouse gas emissions in 2012, successfully
implementing a plan as ambitious as the CPP will go a long way toward
satisfying the United States’ obligations under the Paris Agreement.54
In addition to keeping the country honest to the rest of the world, the
United States can expect these reductions to yield other benefits. For
example, it is predicted that by 2030 the CPP will have reduced emissions of
nitrogen oxides and sulfur dioxide by an estimated 72% and 90% of their
2005 levels, respectively.55 Further, the EPA anticipates that the United
States will accrue $26–$45 billion due to increased health and climate
benefits.56 Some annual health benefits include 1,700 fewer heart attacks,
3,600 fewer premature deaths, 90,000 fewer people suffering asthma attacks,

48
Benjamin Harris, What the Supreme Court’s Stay of the Clean Power Plan Means for the
EPA’s Greenhouse Gas Regulation Moving Forward, STAN. ENVTL. L.J. (Feb. 15, 2016),
https://journals.law.stanford.edu/stanford-environmental-law-journal-elj/blog/what-supreme-c
ourts-stay-clean-power-plan-means-epas-greenhouse-gas-regulation-moving-forward.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines, supra note 47, at 64,665.
54
Learn about Carbon Pollution from Power Plants, EPA, https://19january2017snapshot.
epa.gov/cleanpowerplan/learn-about-carbon-pollution-power-plants_.html (last updated July
27, 2016).
55
Overview of the Clean Power Plan: Cutting Carbon Pollution from Power Plants, EPA,
https://archive.epa.gov/epa/cleanpowerplan/fact-sheet-overview-clean-power-plan.html (last
updated May 9, 2017).
56
Id.
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300,000 fewer missed days of school and work, and more.57 Climate
benefits entail a shift towards a clean energy economy that, by 2030, should
render a 300% increase in wind power and a 2,000% increase in solar power
relative, to the United States’ 2008 levels.58 One would imagine that the
savings caused by this directive will allow the United States to more easily
contribute its share of financial assistance to sources such as Mission
Innovation or developing countries of the Paris Agreement.
V. THE CLEAN POWER PLAN’S PROFOUND CONTROVERSY
Unfortunately for proponents of clean energy initiatives, the CPP has
been stalled by litigation. Twenty-four states have brought suit challenging
the CPP on the basis that “it’s an illegal attempt to ‘reorganize the nation’s
energy grid’ and an attack on the coal industry that will lead to higher
electricity costs.”59 Additionally, several companies with coal-related
interests have intervened in the suit and allege that the EPA is exceeding its
“lawfully delegated authority.”60
In response, the EPA contends that their authority to impose the CPP is
vested in the Clean Air Act.61 The EPA argues that the power to limit carbon
pollution from power plants in this situation is no different from the decadesworth of instances where they regulated other forms of air pollutants from
power plants.62 The EPA has two responses to the allegations that the CPP is
an attack on the coal industry and that it will result in higher prices. First, it
professes the urgent need to address carbon emissions from coal-fired power
plants.63 It even goes so far as to call these emissions a “monumental threat
to Americans’ health and welfare” because they are such a prominent source
of climate change.64 At the very least, this is a compelling public policy
argument. Second, the EPA simply refutes the notion that the CPP will

57
Id. See also The Clean Power Plan Protects Our Environment, Health & Economy,
EPA, https://archive.epa.gov/epa/cleanpowerplan/clean-power-plan-protects-our-environmen
t-health-economy.html (last updated May 9, 2017), for an extended list of the benefits that the
Clean Power Plan will cause.
58
The Clean Power Plan Protects Our Environment, Health & Economy, supra note 57.
59
Bobby Magill, The Suit Against the Clean Power Plan, Explained, CLIMATE CENT. (Apr.
12, 2016), http://www.climatecentral.org/news/the-suit-against-the-clean-power-plan-explain
ed-20234.
60
Alex Horowitz, Clean Power Plan is Lawmaking, Not Rulemaking, Intervenors Say, 36
NO. 17 WESTLAW J. ENVTL. 5, Mar. 2016, at 2.
61
Magill, supra note 59.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id.
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result in higher energy prices.65 As a matter of fact, the EPA declares the
CPP will result in the exact opposite outcome.66
In front of the D.C. Circuit, the plaintiffs brought their case requesting a
stay on the implementation of the CPP.67 In January, “the D.C. Circuit
denied the motion to stay the CPP until litigation concludes on the
substantive challenges to the CPP” brought by the plaintiffs.68 The D.C.
Circuit did this on the basis that the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the stringent
requirements for a stay pending court review.69
Surprisingly, however, the Supreme Court overruled the D.C. Circuit and
granted a stay on the CPP.70 This effectively halted the EPA’s efforts to roll
out the CPP, and instead, the parties to the suit had to wait until they could
present their oral arguments in front of the D.C. Circuit in June of 2016.71
Yet the June hearing did not occur. Instead, a few weeks prior to the hearing
date, the D.C. Circuit announced that it would conduct an en banc review of
the case, thus postponing the case until late September.72 Now, having heard
both parties’ oral arguments, it is expected that the D.C. Circuit will take a
few months before issuing their decision.73 However, regardless of whether
their decision is in favor of the CPP or against it, the EPA will not be able to
immediately begin implementing the CPP. The Supreme Court’s stay will
remain in effect “until the Supreme Court either denies a writ of
certiorari . . . or enters its own judgment.”74 Considering the prominence of
this case and the fact that the Supreme Court is already involved, it is
65

Id.
Id. See also FACT SHEET: Clean Power Plan Benefits of a Cleaner, More Efficient
Power Sector, EPA, https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/cleanpowerplan/fact-sheet-cleanpower-plan-benefits-cleaner-more-efficient-power-sector_.html (last updated July 14, 2016),
for the EPA’s explanation as to why consumers may expect to see a decrease in their
electricity bills by the time the CPP is fully implemented in 2030.
67
Harris, supra note 48.
68
Id. Accord Order, West Virginia v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. filed
Jan. 21, 2016) (order denying preliminary injunction).
69
West Virginia v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, supra note 68, at 2.
70
Harris, supra note 48.
71
Bobby Magill, Obama Confident in Climate Plan Despite Court Setback, CLIMATE CENT.
(Feb. 10, 2016), http://www.climatecentral.org/news/obama-confident-climate-plan-court-set
back-20014.
72
Tim Profeta, Clean Power Plan Court Hearing Delayed to September, NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC (May 19, 2016), http://voices.nationalgeographic.com/2016/05/19/clean-powerplan-court-hearing-delayed-to-september/.
73
Jonathan H. Adler, The En Banc D.C. Circuit Meets the Clean Power Plan, WASH. POST
(Sept. 28, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/09/28/t
he-en-banc-d-c-circuit-meets-the-clean-power-plan/?utmterm=.5f70ee6aefa9.
74
Harris, supra note 48. See also Magill, supra note 59 (indicating the stay will remain in
effect until the Supreme Court decides the case on appeal or instead, allows the D.C. Circuit’s
judgment to stand).
66
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expected that the Supreme Court will grant a writ of certiorari.75 Therefore,
it is unlikely that the fate of the CPP, a directive that is key to meeting the
United States’ global climate commitments for the Paris Agreement, will be
known “until the second quarter of 2017.”76 Fortunately for the proponents
of the Paris Agreement, the CPP’s entanglement in litigation throughout
most of 2016 deterred neither the United States nor other states from
formally committing, as indicated above.
VI. EARLIER GLOBAL EFFORTS TO COMBAT CLIMATE CHANGE
In order to fully understand the significance of the United States’
substantial involvement in the Paris Agreement, one must analyze previous
global agreements to combat climate change and compare their efficacy to
the United States’ involvement. Because climate change has only been taken
seriously by the global community in recent decades, it is useful to remember
that the United States consistently held a role as a world leader throughout all
of these matters. Therefore, whether or not a world leader plays an active
part in global agreements is quite apparent to the rest of the international
community.
In 1987, twenty-four states and the Commission of European
Communities signed the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer (Montreal Protocol).77 This international treaty recognizes the
severity of the globe’s depleting ozone layer and aims to reduce the world’s
emissions of ozone-depleting substances.78 It is worth beginning with the
Montreal Protocol for two reasons. First, it is widely regarded as the world’s
most successful international environmental agreement.79 Second, the

75

See Harris, supra note 48.
Id.
77
Laura Thoms, A Comparative Analysis of International Regimes on Ozone and Climate
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(last visited Nov. 3, 2016). Accord The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
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3007.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2016) (quoting former Secretary General of the United Nations,
Kofi Annan, who remarked “[The Montreal Protocol is] [p]erhaps the single most successful
international agreement to date”).
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Protocol continues to be relevant today to both the United States and the
international community.80
The reasoning for the Montreal Protocol’s near-universal praise is twofold. It attained both mass international participation and exceptional results.
Back in September of 2009, the Montreal Protocol made history as East
Timor ratified the treaty, which made “it the first international environmental
treaty to achieve complete ratification.”81 With the complete support of the
world’s nations, the Montreal Protocol produced remarkable results. Only a
year after garnering universal ratification, nearly every party reported that
they were in compliance with their “phase-out” obligations.82 As a result, the
globe’s ozone-depleting substances have been reduced by 98% from their
historic highs.83 Barring any unexpected setbacks, the Parties’ continued
adherence to the Montreal Protocol have led experts to believe the ozone
layer will be fully recovered by the middle of the twenty-first century.84 This
outcome would unquestionably render the Montreal Protocol a success.
From the outset, the United States played a dominant role in the Montreal
Protocol’s development. With tremendous pressure from both the public and
Congress, the United States was motivated to instigate discussions about
ozone-related treaties.85 Since signing the Montreal Protocol in 1987 and
ratifying it in 1988,86 the United States has continued to play an active role
and has even voluntarily elected to join the treaty’s four subsequent
amendments.87 Even more recently, the United States has demonstrated its

80
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dedication to the cause. As previously noted,88 the United States was a part
of a North American effort to further amend the Montreal Protocol. This
amendment “includes provisions to phase down the production and
consumption, and eliminate byproduct emissions of hydrofluorocarbons
[which are] potent greenhouse gases with global warming
potential . . . thousands of times that of carbon dioxide.”89 To amass support
for the amendment, the United States hosted a gathering of countries in New
York.90 Less than a month later, all 197 members of the Montreal Protocol
agreed to adopt the amendment.91 Thus, the Montreal Protocol evinces that
the United States’ involvement has the capacity to perpetuate global
environmental action.
Despite the United States occasionally taking the lead in furtherance of
the Montreal Protocol, it is difficult to truly grasp how impactful the United
States’ role is without comparing it to other global environmental initiatives.
It just so happens that there exists a sharp contrast to the Montreal Protocol
in regard to the United States’ participation: the Kyoto Protocol.
The Kyoto Protocol was created by the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change,92 the same international organization under
which the Paris Agreement was made at the COP 21.93 Adopted in Kyoto,
Japan in 1997, the Kyoto Protocol entered into force in 2005.94 Since its
inception, the Kyoto Protocol has acquired a substantial amount of support
from the international community.95 Noticeably, absent from this group is
the United States.96
the Montreal Protocol’s four amendments: London Amendment (1990), Copenhagen
Amendment (1992), Montreal Amendment (1997), and Beijing Amendment (1999)).
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The Kyoto Protocol “required participating nations to collectively reduce
[greenhouse gas] emissions by 5 percent below 1990 levels by 2012.”97
More specifically, the treaty “mandated that 37 industrialized nations plus
the European Community cut their greenhouse gas emissions.”98 However,
other Parties were deemed “developing countries” and, therefore, not under
any mandate to comply.99 Rather, the Kyoto Protocol suggests this group
voluntarily reduce their greenhouse gas emissions.100
“The United States did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol treaty and did not
otherwise commit to reducing [greenhouse gas] emissions in large measure
because the [Kyoto] Protocol exempted many developing nations, such as
China and India, from adopting emission limits of their own.”101
Considering China was on pace, and now is,102 the world’s leader in
greenhouse gas emissions, and that both China’s and India’s economies have
grown drastically since the Kyoto Protocol was written,103 the fact that they
get to enjoy the Kyoto Protocol’s exemption can be seen as an unfair
advantage in the world market.
To the dismay of many, the Kyoto Protocol has not enjoyed the same
success as the Montreal Protocol. Instead, it appears to have had mixed
results: On the one hand, the Kyoto Protocol’s original Parties collectively
reduced carbon dioxide greenhouse emissions by 12.5% by 2012 which
exceeded their 4.7% goal;104 on the other hand, by 2014 the world’s carbon
dioxide emissions had increased overall by 51% compared to 1990 levels.105
The question now becomes: can the Kyoto Protocol’s lack of results be
attributed to the United States’ non-participation? At the very least, there is
enough evidence to confidently suggest that the United States’ absence from
the treaty significantly hampered its effectiveness. First, it is difficult to
implement an effective plan to reduce greenhouse gases without constraining
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the two largest emitters of greenhouse gases: the United States and China.106
In addition, there is direct evidence that the United States’ non-involvement
reduced motivation to comply with the Kyoto Protocol. Canada formally
withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol in 2011, a year before the first term was
set to expire.107 Among Canada’s reasons for leaving was the ineffectiveness
of the Kyoto Protocol without the United States.108
VII. HOW THE CPP’S FATE WILL IMPACT THE PARIS AGREEMENT
In the event the Supreme Court decides to strike down the CPP, the
question becomes: How will this affect other Parties’ resolve to meet their
commitments under the Paris Agreement? While these Parties surely
recognize how impactful the United States’ greenhouse emissions are on
climate change, collectively, they are not exceedingly dependent on the
United States’ participation. The remaining Parties to the Agreement can
still have a profound global impact and satisfy many of its goals. This is
because the United States only contributes 16% of the world’s greenhouse
carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels which leaves the rest of the world
the opportunity to reduce the remaining 84%.109 Further, despite Canada’s
withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol because of the United States’ noninvolvement, the remaining members of the agreement stayed committed,
including some of the world’s largest greenhouse gas emitters. This
continuity suggests that the United States’ involvement in global climate
agreements has a noticeable effect, but even without its participation, the
agreements can still achieve their goals.
However, this conjecture has a pronounced flaw. It presumes that
without the CPP, the United States’ contribution towards its global
commitments will become nil, and that it will continue along the same
greenhouse emission trajectory that it is currently on. Yet, regardless of the
passage of the EPA’s CPP, the United States has already made commitments
to limit its emissions in other ways. For example, its commitment to Mission
Innovation and the pursuit of clean energy research and development will not
be impacted by the CPP’s fate. Also, other Parties can still rely on the
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pledges made via the Compact of Mayors because the mayors’ commitments
are similarly independent of the CPP.
In addition to these commitments, the United States can also abide by
other articles of the Paris Agreement without the passage of the CPP. Most
notably, the United States may still provide its portion of the $100 billion of
financial assistance to developing countries to aid their efforts to curb their
environmental impact. Second, the United States may also continue to share
updated technology with developing countries. Third, developing countries
may seek aid from the United States for their capacity-building efforts so that
they can adapt to climate change and mitigate any harmful environmental
effects. These measures are among the most important keys to the success of
the Paris Agreement, and the Supreme Court’s decision on the CPP will not
affect the United States’ role in these regards.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In sum, if litigation kills the CPP, the effects should not be damning to
the Paris Agreement. The United States has other commitments that
exemplify its resolve to contribute to this global dilemma. Considering the
United States’ absence from the Kyoto Protocol did not deter most other
countries from participating, the fact that the United States is showing any
willingness to contribute bodes well for the success of the Paris Agreement.
Hopefully, however, the CPP will survive its day in court and any concern
for potentially negative consequences will become moot.

